Abstract-We describe in this paper a tool named PTF (Passive and Temporal Fingerprinting) for fingerprinting network devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device fingerprinting aims to determine automatically the types (name and version of software, brand name and series of hardware) of remote devices for a given protocol. Hence, keeping a up-to-date inventory database of devices in use on a network is possible and helpful as for example to check remotely if unauthorized applications have been installed. Some types of devices for which vulnerabilities are known can be easily detected in order to patch them or at least send alerts to the owners. From a security point of view, attackers use specific tools to perform their attack which may also be detected rapidly thanks to fingerprinting. Obviously, classical management solutions exists for building a network inventory as for example SNMP [I] but it requires specific installed software on the monitored computers which is not always possible because some machines are not necessarily owned by the operating company (personal or partner company devices) or cannot support SNMP software. Network operators cannot require that their customers install a specific software.
Most application level protocols do contain information about the device identity (user agent) that generated the message, but in most cases it is not protected against malicious scrubbing. Most of the existing fingerprinting approaches are based either on identifying specific deviations in the imple mentation of a given protocol. Such deviations often occur because of simple omissions in the specifications/normsmany current specifications either do not completely cover all the exceptional cases or lack the necessary precision, and thus leave to many degrees of freedom to the implementers.
The main contribution of our paper is a new fingerprint ing scheme that is accurate even on protocol stacks that are completely identical, but which run on hardware having different capabilities (CPU power, memory resources, etc).
We propose a fingerprinting scheme that can learn distinctive patterns in the state machine of a particular implementation.
We see such a pattern as a restricted tree finite state machine that provides additional time-related information about the transitions performed.
Our paper is structured as follows: the architecture of PTF (Passive Temporal Fingerprinting) is described in section II.
Section III presents the formal model of our method. Section IV explains the fingerprint generation. Section V focuses on the classification method. The evaluation metrics are given in section VI and the datasets are detailed in section VII. Section VIII focuses on fine tuning of the method based on a single dataset. Section IX presents complete results from several datasets. Related work is in section X before concluding. The different messages and sessions are identified by a syn tactic analyzer if the syntax is known. Otherwise a reverse engineering module has to automatically discover the message types such as we proposed in [2] and the splitter module delimits the sessions by grouping messages among two entities (identified by IP addresses and ports) and by considering a session is finished after an inactivity period.
II. PTF ARCHITECTURE
The TR-FSM builder has to create the corresponding finger prints as TR-FSMs (the next section details this step). Finally, the classification stage is divided into two parts:
• during the learning phase (learning module), the finger prints database is generated by identifying the devices using some knowledge (labeled samples)
• during the testing phase (testing module), the device identification module tests new fingerprints against the database in order to determine the device types.
Finally, fingerprinting can support various kind of appli cations like automatic inventory or automatic patching as highlighted in figure 1.
III. FORMAL MODEL
We model a behavioral fingerprint using a Temporal Ran dom Parameterized Tree Extended Finite State Machine (TR FSM). The TR-FSM is an extension of the parameterized extended finite state machine introduced in [3] . Our extension concerns the introduction of temporal information and one additional constraint on the transitions in the state machine.
A TR-FSM is formally defined by a tuple M = < S, Sinit, I, 0, X, T, Y > where:
• S is a finite set of states with lSI = n;
• Sinit is the initial state;
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• X is a vector of variables;
• T is a finite set of transitions and t E T is defined as
Sl and S2 are the start and end state, i is the input symbol triggering the transition and 0 is the triggered output symbol. P(X, i( iJ)) represents the condition to achieve the transition and Q(X, i( iJ), o( w)) is the action triggered by the transition, based on an operation on the different parameters;
• Y is a n -1 dimensional random vector described later.
The transitions are restricted to form a tree: 
Hence, the cardinality of T is defined by ITI = n -1 and T = {tl, "" tn-I}.
Finally Y is a n -1 dimensional random vector with rt, representing the (measured) average time to perform the transition tj.
In the rest of the paper, states and transitions are synonyms for nodes and edges because the TR-FSMs are both trees and state machines. Thus, a TR-FSM can be characterized by its height and its cardinality corresponding to lSI.
The location at which the time measure is taken is im portant, especially when done from a remote site and over a network. The inherent additional noise due to the round-trip time can be filtered out. Its estimation is a topic investigated by many works such as [4] . This is done by taking the network round-trip time into account. Alternatively, if the fingerprinting is integrated within an intrusion detection system, the mea surements can be used directly without any other additional filtering, because in this case the system is learning local and deployment-specific parameterized device signatures.
The problem of fingerprinting can be now stated as fol lows. Given a candidate group of implementations C = {Ml' M2, ... , Mk} and a set of behavioral fingerprints {Tjl' Tj2, ... , Tjp} for each implementation l'vlj, the goal is to find a classifier that correctly maps behavioral fingerprints to the corresponding classes.
IV. TR-FSM MODULE

A. SIP background
We have considered SIP [5] as a target application domain since it is widely deployed. It is designed for managing multimedia session such as VolP from initiating to termination. A session is composed of a sequence of messages and its delimitation depends on the protocol. Considering the SIP protocol, a session is identified by a specific identifier (SIP call ID).
B. Fingerprint generation
The fingerprint is a tree with a generic ROOT node. The fingerprint represents a specific device and is generated from a subset of sessions in which this device participates. Each state of the TR-FSM is represented by a SIP message type prefixed by ! (outgoing message at the device fingerprinted)
or ? (ongoing message at the device fingerprinted). The algorithm 1 details the construction of a signature. For the sake of simplicity, the delay of a transition is directly stored on the node representing the end state without loss of information, since the tree structure involves only one ongoing edge for each node. Briefly, the algorithm maintains a current node initialized to the ROOT node. For each message m of the sessions, lines 16-18 aim to find a node n corresponding to the type of m among the children of the current node in order to update it. If this is not possible, a new node is created. The delay associated with an edge is the average delay in transmitting the corresponding message.
Considering a total of n messages, s sessions and the number of messages per session ni = ISil, algorithm 1 iterates over all messages of all sessions, meaning that the number of iterations of lines 11 and 13 equals n. For each message, in the worst case the search (line 16) iterates over all possible children, which are at most as many as the previously examined sessions. Therefore the total number of iterations is it = I::= l i x ni. Considering that all sessions except the last have only one message, we obtain the maximal value it = s(n-(s-l))+ I::�; i = ns+1.5s-0.5s 2 < ns+1.5s. Because, unlike n, the number of sessions to use is a fixed constant parameter, the overall complexity is O( n).
V. CLASSIFICATION MODULE
A dataset is composed of N TR-FSM: tl, t2,' .. tN. Each dataset is divided into a learning set (also named training set) used to train the system and a testing set for evaluating the performance of the system when applied to new data. Each sub-dataset also has an associated size: N _train and N _test with N = N _train + N _test.
The number of sessions extracted for building each tree is named session size: training session size for the training set and test session-size for the testing set. These are important parameters for our method. There are N _types distinct device types: D = dl, d2,·· . dN_types. Two functions can be applied to each tree ti:
• real(ti) returns the real identifier (device type) for a TR FSM ti • assigned(ti) returns the class name (device type) for a TR-FSM ti that is assigned by the fingerprinting scheme.
A. Support vector machines classification
We briefly review the basics of support vector machines (SVM) in this section to make the paper self-contained. Additional reference material can be found in [6] . We adapted multi-class classification [7] to our fingerprinting task based on the one-to-one technique due to its good trade-off between classification accuracy and computational time [8] .
The SVM classes correspond to the N _types device types, and the input space data points are the N _train trees from the training set. Firstly, each point ti of the training set is mapped to a high-dimensional feature space thanks a non linear map function ¢(ti). The motivation of this step is to improve the separability of data points by adding dimensions.
Then, for each class pairwise < C l , Ck >, an hyperplane with the maximum separation from both classes is found. First, we define the points involved for these classes:
The hyperplane is defined by a vector w lk and a scalar b lk.
The associated optimization problem is converted to its dual form using the Lagrangian. Hence, assuming that p�: is equal to 1 when ti E TL and -1 when ti E TK, the problem is: max L a��-� L a��a�;p��p�;K (ti,tj) (2) tiE{T,uTd tiE{T,uTd tjE{T,uTd subject to:
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where K is a kernel function such as the following dot product:
This kernel trick allows the problem to be solved without computing or knowing the ¢ function. The only requirement is a kernel function which has to be applied to each pair of data points. It is a function constrained by Mercer's theorem [9] . In fact, the support vectors are the trees ti with non-zero a i� and form the set SV lk from which b lk is obtained:
Finally, a decision function, applied to each tx of the testing set, is defined as:
During the testing stage, each decision function iL k is applied to ti, where ti is a TR-FSM to classify. Depending on the return value, ti is assigned to the class C l or C k . Using a voting scheme, the class chosen most often is considered to be correct.
There are two main advantages of SVM:
• the projection of points into a higher dimensional for increasing the ability to separate data points,
• the decision functions are based on support vectors which represent a small subset of initial data points. Thus, the computation time of decision functions is reduced. For instance, the same SIP stack running on a CPU-limited capabilities hardphone will show higher transition times than the same stack on a high-performance workstation (softphone).
B. Kernel function
The kernel function is one important parameter in SVM. Al though the Gaussian kernel is a well-known possible function for simple data points given by a tuple of values, the current problem data points are trees with labeled edges. Therefore, we extend our previous method [10] , based on the tree comparison method proposed in [11] . The goal is to obtain a similarity The intersection of the trees ti and tj is defined as:
In figure 3 , the two fingerprint intersections are shaded in gray. For all shared paths, weight are derived from the delay differences and summed to obtain the similarity measure:
inter _sim = weight(paths%,pathsf) (8) pElij nodes(pathk)=p nodes(pathi )=p
Without considering the delays, pathl and path% are exactly the same for a given p. A comparison function is then calculated for each node n p E p based on the Laplace kernel:
weight(Pl,P2) = L e-al fdelay (n,p ,j-fdelay (n,P2)1 (9) npEpl where fdela y (n, p) is a time-based function which returns the average delay for the ongoing edge from node n in the path p. Because a fingerprint concerns one device only, the delay caused by to other equipment has to be discarded, and so fdela y (n,p) = 0 for n a message received by the device (node name prefixed by?).
Finally, the kernel function is: pElij npEp
It satisfies Mercer's theorem due to usual kernel construction properties [9] .
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Standard metrics for multi-class classification are defined in [12] . X d is the number of trees corresponding to a particular device type d. 
The specificity of a device type d represents the percentage of trees labeled as d and which are really of this type.
The overall metric, designated fingerprinting accuracy in this paper, corresponds to the percentage of trees correctly identified. The corresponding formula is:
The mutual information coefficient (IC) is a combination of entropies using the following distribution: X = x;/ N _test, Y = Y;/ N _test, Z = Zij / N _test. It is defined as:
where H is the entropy function. This IC is a ratio between o and 1 (perfect classification). It helps to compare classifi cations with the same overall accuracy (the ratio is degraded if some classes are not well identified). For example, if 80% of data points are of the same type, assigning all of them to a single class implies an accuracy of 80% but an information coefficient equal to O.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL DATASETS
We made extensive use of network traces from which we could extract the SIP user agent (device type) in order to perform both the training and the testing our system. We assumed that our traces did not contain malicious messages, where for instance an attacker spoofed the user agent field.
PTF is based on the LIBSVM library [13] and is available at http://wiki.uni.lu/secan-Iab/docs/ptf. tar.gz.
We used two kinds of datasets. The first was generated from our testbed composed of various end-user equipment including softphones like Twinkle or Ekiga and hard phones from the following brands: Cisco, Linksys, Snom or
Thomson. The testbed also used servers such as As t e r i s k
and OpenSer/Cisco Call Manager. This dataset will be de scribed as testbed dataset in the remainder of the paper. The other datasets designated operator datasets (T1 to T4) were provided by four real VolP operators (about 45MB of traces were extracted) with more than 700 distinct We considered only messages emitted by the corresponding devices and we used a logarithmic scale. For the two datasets, the distribution of messages per device type is obviously not uniform, reflecting reality because some devices are used more than others. Thus, this implies that the differences between device types for the number of sessions are similar. Addition ally, the distribution ranges of the number of messages and the number of sessions is greater for the operator T1 ( figure   4 (b». Hence, the differences between devices are highlighted.
For instance, one kind of device has only generated one SIP session while another more than 10,000 as shown on the second graph of figure 4(b).
Based on average time delay differences, it seems possible to fingerprint devices. However, when these differences are however insignificant, additional information is needed. Our approach combines the temporal aspect with the behavioral aspect. For example, in figure 4(b) , four or five groups of devices can be easily identified just by comparing the aver age delays. Considering the dataset T1, the transition delays are generally higher than for testbed dataset and the median value is doubled. 
VIII. TESTBED DATASET RESULTS
We used testbed dataset to assess the accuracy of the behavioral and temporal fingerprinting. One objective was to determine the impact of the different parameters on these performance metrics and tune them. These tuned parameters would then be used on the larger operator datasets.
We randomly selected 40% of the sessions of each device With the exception of Section VIII-C, a is set to 1000.
A. Session-size tree
We first investigate the optimal session sizes (number of sessions required for building a TR-FSM). The test session size is more important because it shows how reactive the system is. In the best case, a session size of one implies the recognition of one device with only one session. Secondly, we look at the relationship between testing and training session size. Finally, the low standard deviation shown in brackets indi cates that the accuracy is stable among the different experi ments especially in the best configurations (dark gray).
Regarding the average sensitivity appearing in table III, the optimal configuration is still the same and the corresponding accuracy is 65%. This relatively low result is due mainly to some incorrectly fingerprinted devices. In fact, some device types are poorly represented in the dataset as shown in figure   4 (a). For instance, a training session size of five and a training set of 40% of sessions results in a minimal number of 15/0.4l = 13 sessions which is not the case for six device types ( figure 4(a) ). Furthermore, this minimal value implies only one training tree and all learning techniques need more training data for efficiency. The impact of training set size is studied in the next subsection.
Although comparing identically-sized trees seems more logical, this experiment shows the reverse due primary to our comparison function, which considers the various paths in the trees separately (see equations (7)- (10) ).
B. Training set size
As it was previously mentioned, the fingerprinting accuracy per type is much affected by underrepresented devices. We assess the minimal training trees per type of device capable of achieving good results. This number varies from 1 to 20 in figure 5 . Firstly, if there are at least two trees for each kind, the accuracy is more than 80% in most cases. Thus, a training session size of 5 implies at least 5 x 2 = 10 sessions for the training process, which is reasonable. Going further, the accuracy is close to 90% for a size equals eight.
C. Effect of the a parameter
The parameter a is introduced in formula (10), and has a potential impact on fingerprinting accuracy. The higher a is, the more important are small delay differences. Figure 6 highlights the impact of Minimal number of training trees 
IX. GLOBAL RESULTS
We will consider a train session-size of five and a test session of ten because this configuration previously gave the best results. demonstrating that our fingerprinting approach is suited to many distinct configurations.
For the operators, the overall accuracy reaches about 86%, which is lower than the testbed dataset (91%), due principally to additional noise on Internet. Moreover, the mu tual information coefficient (IC) for the testbed dataset is very high, indicating that the high accuracy is not due an over-represented kind of device. However, this coefficient is lower for the operator datasets because some devices are clearly present in greater numbers than others, as high lighted in 4(b). Once again, for several devices, the number of sessions is too low to have complete training sets and so the average sensitivity is concentrated between 45% and 58%.
However, the high specificity means that the misclassified trees are well-scattered among the different types.
By design, PTF is only able to classify types included in the learning phase which the complexity is dependent on the learning set size. However, it can be done offline before applying the testing phase which has to be very fast. In our experiments, identifying a device in this phase takes always less than 0.07ms.
X. RELATED WORK
Passive fingerprinting monitors network traffic without any interaction as for instance pOl' [14] , which uses a set of TCP signatures to identify the operating system. In contrast, active fingerprinting probes a device by generating specific requests.
[15] implements this scheme in order to detect the operating system and service versioning. Related work is [16] and [17] which describe active probing and proposes a mechanism to automatically explore and select the right requests to make.
Fingerprinting might have also other interpretations: for in stance [18] focus on the identification on the flow types.
The device fingerprinting is more fine grained. SIP finger printing is usually based on a manual analysis [19] or active probing [20] . Our approach is totally passive and generic since the only requirement to identify a device is to do the learning process with a dataset containing this device. In our previous works [10] , [21] , syntactic trees based fingerprinting provides good accuracy but are highly computational and need the knowledge of the entire syntax of the protocol. We also adapted the method presented in this paper to datasets with few labeled samples in [22] .
We have addressed a somewhat related topic in [2] , where we looked at the identification of the different message types used by an unknown protocol and were able to build up the tracking state machines from network traces. That approach can serve to build TR-FSMs for an unknown protocol without any domain-specific knowledge. Besides, we have not until now considered both behavioral and temporal aspects of the fingerprinting task at the same time.
Construction of the state machine of a protocol from a set of examples has been studied in the past. Although known to be NP complete (see [23] , [24] for good overviews on this topic), the existing heuristics for this task it are based on building tree
representations. In our approach we do not prune the tree and, although the final tree representation is dependent on the order in which we constructed the tree, we argue that the resulting subtrees have good discriminative features. Tree kernels for SVM have recently been introduced in [25] , [26] and allow the use of substructures of the original sets as features. Our approach extends this concept in order to be applicable to the TR-FSMs we defined. In consequence, a new valid kernel is proposed in this paper.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of fingerprint ing device types. Our approach is based on the analysis of temporal and state-machine-induced features. We introduced the TR-FSM, a tree-structured parameterized finite state ma chine having time-annotated edges. A TR-FSM represents a fingerprint for a device/stack. Several such fingerprints are associated with a device type. We propose a supervised learn ing method, where SVM use kernel functions defined over the space of TR-FSMs. It allows an automatic classification whereas most of current approaches relies on manually built signatures. We validated our approach using SIP as a target protocol. Regarding the required knowledge limited to the message types, the accuracy between 81 % and 91 % is quite good. Obviously, users have to carefully consider the error rate depending on the final application supported by the fingerprinting. Our future work includes the study of other protocols as for instance wireless protocols. We will also define other kernel functions specific to the TR-FSMs that allow the modeling of the probability distribution of transition times at each edge.
